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COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

A Creditable VAT?
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor
of Law and director of the international tax LLM
program at the University of Michigan. Prof. Avi
Yonah thanks Yariv Brauner, Peter Byrne, Itai Grin
berg, Yoram Keinan, Victoria Perry, Martin Tittle, and
Philip West for their helpful comments.

Introduction: The Bolivian Experiment
In the early 1990s, Bolivia tried to adopt a popular U.S.
tax reform proposal: replacing its corporate income tax
with a cash-flow-type consumption tax, broadly similar
in structure to taxes proposed by a long line of theorists
from Prof. William Andrews in 1974 to the President's
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform in 2006. Unfortu
nately, the Bolivian experiment ran into an insuperable
obstacle: the U.S. foreign tax credit (FTC) rules. The U.S.
Treasury decided that the Bolivian tax would not be
creditable for U.S. corporations investing in Bolivia.
Given the importance of U.S. foreign direct investment
(FDI) for Bolivia, that was the end of the experiment.1
Why was the Bolivian tax ruled not creditable? The
code does not put explicit limits on which taxes should be
creditable, although it does refer to "income taxes."2
Under the interpretive regulations, a creditable tax must
contain three elements: It must be imposed on gross
income (the gross income requirement), it must allow for
deductions similar to those permitted under the U.S.
income tax (the net income requirement), and it must
incorporate a realization requirement.3
There are two basic ways of designing a cash flow tax,
identified by the Meade Commission in the United
Kingdom as the R (real) and R+F (real and financial)
methods. Under the R method, all receipts are included
in income and all expenditures are currently deductible,
but financial transactions (borrowing and debt repay
ment) are ignored. Under the R+F method, loans are
included in income and both interest and principal

1
Charles E. Mclure and George Zodrow, "Creditability
Concerns Doom Bolivian Flat Tax," Tax Notes Int'/, Mar. 11, 1996,
p. 825.
2
Section 901; Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573 (1938). For
the historical background for this language, see Joseph Isen
bergh, "The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Cred
itable Taxes," 39 Tax L. Rev. 227 (1984); Glenn E. Coven,
"International Comity and the Foreign Tax Credit: Crediting
Nonconforming Taxes," 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 83 (1999). Taxes "in lieu"
of an income tax can be creditable under section 903, and
Treasury can by treaty render noncreditable taxes creditable. See,
e.g., the creditability of the Italian IRAP (a subnational tax
similar enough to a VAT to raise an issue before the European
Court of Justice) under the new Italy-U.S. treaty.
"Reg. section 1.901-2. None of those requirements apply to an
in lieu tax.
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payments are deductible. The net effect of the Rand R+F
methods is the same because the inclusion of loan
proceeds in income is offset by the deductibility of
principal and the interest deduction takes into account
the time value of money between the borrowing and the
repayment.
Bolivia initially proposed to adopt the R method tax as
the simpler of the two, but the U.S. Treasury ruled that
the tax would not be creditable because it does not allow
for an interest deduction and thus violates the net income
requirement. Bolivia then switched to the R+F method,
which does allow for an interest deduction, but was told
that this did not work either because the inclusion of loan
principal in income violates the gross income requirement. Bolivia then gave up and retained its regular
corporate income tax (which does not allow for expensing capital expenditures and is therefore much more
complex than the cash flow tax).
I believe that result is unfortunate. Joseph Isenbergh
proposed over 20 years ago that all taxes that are not
royalties and are not offset by refunds or subsidies
should be creditable, and I agree with him. 4 The creditability requirements significantly limit the ability of small
developing countries like Bolivia that depend heavily on
U.S. FDI to reform their tax system.
However, in this article I propose to use the Bolivian
experiment to suggest another way in which a small
developing country can benefit from the current U.S.
rules. The most important tax in most developing countries is not the income tax, but the VAT. VATs are
currently not creditable, but if they could be made
creditable, that could provide a significant boost to U.S.
FDI in developing countries.

Designing a Creditable VAT
Why is the VAT not creditable? The problem is not the
treatment of financial transactions: VATs do not include
loan principal in income, and do allow a deduction for
interest. VATs also fulfill the gross income requirement
because they are imposed on gross receipts, and they
fulfill the realization requirement because they are a
consumption tax that depends on realization events.
The reason VATs are not creditable is simply that they
do not allow a deduction for wages. 5 Not deducting
wages can be a reason for disallowing an otherwise
creditable tax, as the Russians discovered in the 1990s
when they tried to limit the deduction for wages and
were told that even by treaty that would make their
corporate tax noncreditable (ironically, this happened
about the same time the $1 million cap on deductible
wages was enacted in the United States). Instead, Russia
opted for taxing wages above the cap at 100 percent in the
hands of the recipient.

But if that is the problem for the VAT, there's a simple
solution: make wages deductible for VAT purposes, but
impose a tax at the same rate on the wage recipient. In
effect, all employees would become registered VAT taxpayers. Nor is it necessary to collect the VAT from the
employees: The tax can be withheld and remitted by the
employers because that certainly does not negate deductibility (otherwise no corporate income tax would be
creditable because all corporate employers withhold on
wages).
But, readers may object, what about the fact that the
VAT is a consumption tax, not an income tax, and that the
FTC under section 901 and Biddle is supposed to apply
only to income taxes? The question is why the FTC is
limited to income taxes, and the modern rationale is that
they are direct taxes, borne by the taxpayer, whereas
VATs are indirect taxes, borne by the consumer. Thus, the
FTC is not needed to prevent double taxation in the case
of VATs because they are shifted to the consumer.
However, that argument proves too much: If the
condition for creditability were to prove that the economic burden of the tax falls on the taxpayer, most
corporate income taxes would not be creditable, because
it is notoriously impossible to prove that they are not
shifted to consumers or employees. That's why the
technical taxpayer rule requires only a showing that
foreign law imposes legal liability on the U.S. taxpayer,
not that the U.S. taxpayer actually bears the burden of the
tax. 6
In fact, I do not believe that there is a demonstrable
difference in incidence between a VAT and a corporate
income tax. If there were, corporate taxpayers all over the
world would not spend huge resources on trying to
avoid both. I believe the incidence of both depends on the
market conditions faced by the taxpayer. But even if I am
wrong, as a technical matter the FTC regulations do not
depend on the economic incidence of the tax.

The WTO Problem
The reader may now ask why this has not been tried.
One reason may be that a VAT with a deduction for
wages might not be border-adjustable (imposed on imports and rebated on exports) under the World Trade
Organization export subsidy rules.
That, in fact, is the major problem with the tax reform
panel's growth and investment tax (GIT) proposal. The
GIT is a variation of David Bradford's X-tax, which is a
corporate cash flow tax with a deduction for wages and
a progressive rate structure imposed on the wage recipient. The panel argued that the GIT should pass WTO
muster, because it is "equivalent to a credit-method VAT
at a 30 percent rate, coupled with a progressive system of
wage subsidies and a separate single-rate tax on capital

4

Isenbergh, supra note 2.
Note that the technical reason the VAT is a consumption tax
and not an income tax, namely the current expensing of capital
expenditures, is not a problem for creditability - it was not an
issue for Bolivia, or for the United Kingdom when it adopted
current expensing of capital expenditures in its 1973 corporate
tax reform.
5

794

6
Reg. section 1.901-2(f). The FTC is allowed even when
demonstrably the U.S. taxpayer does not bear the burden, as in
gross-up provisions in loan agreements that shift any withholding tax to the borrower.
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income. The Panel therefore believes that the Growth and
Investment Tax Plan should be border adjustable." 7
However, the panel clearly had misgivings about that
conclusion, because it went on to state that "given the
uncertainty over whether border adjustments would be
allowable under current trade rules, and the possibility of
challenge from our trading partners, the Panel chose not
to include any revenue that would be raised through
border adjustments in making the Growth and Investment Tax Plan revenue neutral." 8 That was a $775 billion
difference, so it's a major problem with the GIT plan.
The panel was correct in its assessment that there
might be a problem. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade Article XVI prohibits subsidies "on the export of
any product ... which subsidy results in the sale of such
product for export at a price lower than the comparable
price charged for the like product to buyers in the
domestic market." However, a note to GATT Article XVI
clarifies that the exemption of an exported product from
taxes borne by the like product when destined for
domestic consumption (such as zero rating exports for
the VAT) "shall not be deemed to be a subsidy."
Article XVI was significantly expanded by the Subsidies Code included in the 1994 version of the GATT. The
Subsidies Code defines a subsidy as including cases in
which "government revenue that is otherwise due is
foregone or not collected." To be actionable under the
GATT, a subsidy must be "specific to an enterprise or
industry or group of enterprises or industries." Also, a
specific subsidy is prohibited only if it is "contingent, in
law or in fact ... upon export performance" or "upon the
use of domestic over imported goods."
Annex I to the Subsidies Code includes an "illustrative
list of export subsidies," which includes "[t]he full or
partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports of direct taxes ... paid or payable by
industrial or commercial enterprises." What is a direct
tax? Subsidies Code footnote 58 defines direct taxes to
include income taxes and indirect taxes to include VATs.
The $775 billion question for the president's tax reform
panel is thus: Is the GIT a direct or indirect tax? The GIT
has three significant differences from a VAT: It uses the
subtraction method, rather than the credit method; it
allows a deduction for wages; and it imposes a separate
tax on income from capital. Given those differences,
which were all necessitated by the desire to make the GIT
look more like an income tax, it seems unlikely that the
GIT could survive a WTO challenge. Moreover, given
that adoption of the GIT and abolition of the U.S.
corporate tax would result in major shifts of capital from
the European Union to the United States, such a challenge by the EU is exceedingly likely.
However, such a challenge is much less likely if a
smal_l developing country were to amend its VAT along
the Imes described above. 9 First, the impact on the world

7

Report of the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform (2006), pp. 171-172.
8
Id. at 172.
9
In fact, the WTO export subsidy prohibition in SCM 3.l(a)
never applies to least-developed countries and also does not

economy and the visibility of the reform would of course
be much smaller than if the world's biggest economy
adopted the GIT plan (which, unlike the small developing country, would require the United States to abolish
the corporate income tax). Second, the only change from
a traditional VAT would be the deductibility of wages;
the VAT would be credit method and would not include
a tax on capital income. Finally, under the WTO rules, a
VAT is clearly border-adjustable but is not defined either
in the WTO rules or in any WTO decision. Arguably, any
tax labeled a VAT is border-adjustable under the WTO
rules. 10 Thus, I do not believe there would be a WTO
issue if a small developing country adopted a modified
VAT along the lines described above.

Proposal for a Small Developing Country
What would be the U.S. response if a small developing
country tried to modify its existing VAT along the lines
set out above (that is, making wages deductible to the
employer for VAT purposes, but taxable to the employees
at the same rate)?
Treasury would probably rule that the VAT is not
creditable because (a) the FTC is limited to income taxes
under section 901 and the regulations; (b) the VAT is a
consumption tax; and (c) making wages deductible does
not convert the VAT from a consumption to an income
tax, especially because the effect of the deduction is
arguably negated by imposing a withholding tax at the
same rate.
Treasury might also be influenced by the thought of
what would happen if other countries followed the small
developing country's lead. Martin Tittle has estimated
that if all VATs were creditable (subject, of course, to the
section 904 limitation), that could lead to an annual
revenue loss of $8 billion to $16 billion. 11
But that's not the end of the story. Bolivia had to give
up on its tax reform once the cash flow tax was ruled not
creditable, because it was replacing a creditable corporate
income tax. But the VAT is currently not creditable, so the
small developing country would not lose anything by
trying.
The next step therefore would be for a U.S. taxpayer
with business operations in the small developing country
to pay the modified VAT, claim the credit on its tax
return, and take the IRS to court. Given the history of
section 901 and the regulations thereunder, I believe there
is a good chance the taxpayer would win and the
modified VAT would be ruled creditable. 12

apply to some developing countries that have requested relief.
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Martin B. Tittle, "Foreign Direct
Investment in Latin America: Overview and Current Status?"
Inter-American Development Bank (Dec. 2002).
rnThe tax reform panel could not call the GIT a VAT because
of the negative political repercussions.
11
Martin B. Tittle, "A Projection of the Maximum Revenue
Loss From Foreign Tax Credits for Value-Added Taxes," (fort/1coming in Tax Notes International) see also Martin B. Tittle, "U.S.
Foreign Tax Creditability for VAT: Another Arrow in the ET!/
E-VAT Quiver," Tax Notes Int'l, May 26, 2003, p. 809.
12
For the history, see lsenbergh, supra note 2.

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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If that were to happen, other countries might modify
their VAT in the same way. The United States would then
have to either change the code and regulations to make
the modified VAT not creditable, or accept the result.
Like Isenbergh, I believe the correct policy answer is
that all foreign taxes that are not royalties, not refunded
or subsidized, and not soak-up taxes should be creditable
up to the section 904 limit because there is no meaningful
difference between creditable and noncreditable taxes.
Thus, I would argue that the United States should accept
the result and grant the credit for all foreign taxes. That
would have two positive results: It would mean that the
United States will get out of the business of telling other
countries what tax reforms they can or cannot adopt, and
it could also lead to a significant increase in FDI to small
developing countries in which the VAT is the main source
of revenue.

796

Finally, such a result would mean that the EU would
benefit because the United States would credit its VAT (if
the EU modified it) while the EU would not have to
credit the United States's (because the United States does
not have one). That might make it more appealing for us
to follow the rest of the OECD in adopting a VAT in
addition to the income tax, which as I have argued
elsewhere is a desirable step in its own right. 13

13
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "Risk, Rents, and Regressivity: Why
the United States Needs Both an Income Tax and a VAT," Tax
Notes, Dec. 20, 2004, p. 1651. If the United States did adopt a
VAT, that would make it easy to raise much more than S16
billion.
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